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Nontechnical summary 
This paper measures the quality of apprenticeship training by comparing the wage difference 
between apprentices who change their employer or occupation directly after the training 
period with apprentices who stay in the training firm and their occupation. It tests 
empirically which individual, occupation, and employer characteristics have an impact on 
these differences. A little wage advantage for those who change their employer after the 
apprenticeship training is an indication that the German dual apprenticeship training system 
provides generally usable human capital. There are small average wage losses for occupation 
changers who do not simultaneously change their employer. In general, a change of 
occupation does not have a wage impact. These average effects mask large differences by 
occupation groups, however. For apprentices in commerce and trading occupations, 
changing the employer is associated with a large positive wage mark-up. Apprentices in 
industrial occupations suffer from wage disadvantages when they have to change their 
employer or occupation. These results support the findings that industrial occupations are 
relatively specific and establishments that offer industrial occupations invest in 
apprenticeship training, try to keep their apprentices after the training period and offer 
attractive internal labour markets. Apprentices with an upper secondary education who 
change their employer get a higher wage mark-up than the stayers – this indicates that 
better qualified apprentices are privileged because they have the interesting outside option 
to acquire an academic qualification. The distinction between occupation groups and 
apprentices with different schooling back-grounds is new. The previous literature mainly 
concentrates on differences in economic sectors and firm size. We do not find large wage 
differences for occupation and/or employer changers in East-Germany, between the 
manufacturing and services sectors or from an apprenticeship training establishment which 
is smaller than the first skilled employer, however.  
A series of robustness checks demonstrates that occupation selection, the decision to 
change the employer and/or occupation, unobserved heterogeneity between apprentices, 
and the homogeneity of the sample regarded all have a strong impact on the estimation 
results. This indicates that previous results might be biased. 
 
 
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag misst die Qualität der Lehrlingsausbildung durch Lohnvergleiche von 
Lehrlingen, die entweder ihren Arbeitgeber oder ihren Beruf direkt nach Beendigung der 
Ausbildung wechseln mit denjenigen, die im Betrieb und Beruf verbleiben. Ein geringer 
Lohnvorteil von Berufswechslern ist ein Indikator dafür, dass das deutsche duale 
Ausbildungssystem im Durchschnitt allgemein auf dem Arbeitsmarkt brauchbare 
Qualifikationen vermittelt. Berufswechsler, die nicht gleichzeitig ihren Arbeitgeber nach der 
Ausbildungszeit wechseln haben einen kleinen Lohnnachteil. Diese durchschnittlichen 
Effekte verdecken jedoch große Differenzen zwischen Berufsgruppen. Für Auszubildende in 
Handelsberufen ist ein Arbeitgeberwechsel mit einem starken Lohnaufschlag verbunden. 
Auszubildende in industriellen Berufen hingegen sehen sich starken Lohnnachteilen 
gegenüber, wenn sie ihren Arbeitgeber oder den Beruf wechseln. Diese Resultate 
unterstützen die Erkenntnis, dass industrielle Berufe relativ unternehmensspezifisch sind 
und dass Unternehmen, die diese Berufe anbieten, in die Ausbildung investieren, die 
Absolventen zu halten versuchen und attraktive interne Arbeitsmärkte für die 
Auszubildenden anbieten. Auszubildende mit Abitur erhalten einen Lohnvorteil, wenn sie 
den Arbeitgeber wechseln – dies könnte ein Hinweis darauf sein, dass diese Personengruppe 
aufgrund ihrer Außenoption ein Studium aufzunehmen privilegiert ist. Die Unterscheidung 
zwischen Berufsgruppen und Auszubildenden mit unterschiedlicher Schulvorbildung wir in 
diesem Beitrag zum ersten Mal getroffen. In der bisherigen Literatur werden vor allem 
Unterschiede zwischen Wirtschaftssektoren und Unternehmensgrößen untersucht. Wir 
finden jedoch kaum Lohnunterschiede für Wechsler in Ostdeutschland, zwischen 
verarbeitendem und Dienstleistungssektor und von einem kleineren zu einem größeren 
Betrieb.  
Eine Reihe von Robustheitstests zeigt, dass Selektivität von Berufswahl, Arbeitgeber oder 
Berufswechsel, unbeobachtete Heterogenität zwischen Auszubildenden und die 
Homogenität der betrachteten Ausbildenden einen starken Einfluss auf die Ergebnisse haben 
können. 
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Abstract 
Small average wage effects of employer and/or occupation changes mask large differences 
between occupation groups and apprentices with different schooling back-grounds. 
Apprentices in commerce and trading occupations strongly profit from an employer change. 
Employer and occupation changers in industrial occupations face large wage disadvantages 
however. We are the first to analyse these differences. Quality differences of apprenticeship 
quality between training firms that have been mainly discussed so far are small, however. 
This paper also explains differences between previous findings by comparing their 
estimation strategies. It demonstrates that selectivity into occupations and changers, 
unobserved heterogeneity between occupations, and the sample selection matter and 
proposes several improvements in the estimation technique to measure apprenticeship 
quality. 
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1 Introduction 
Differences in the quality of apprenticeship training are a recurring topic in the literature. 
Soskice (1994) argues that the German apprenticeship system can be split into two groups. 
According to this seminal paper the first group consists of high-quality apprenticeship 
programmes typically provided by large firms in industry and commerce. Apprentices in 
these economic sectors enjoy high take-over rates and low wage losses when they have to 
change their employer or occupation because the skills acquired during their apprenticeship 
are transferable and have a high value on the labour market. Most of those who pass 
through the second group of apprenticeships – low-quality and relatively cheap 
apprenticeships mainly provided by the crafts and construction sector – have a weaker 
qualification background. Therefore they rather accept low wages and employment as semi-
skilled employee in other establishments if they are not taken over because their alternative 
would be unemployment. Based on this paper, several contributions look at differences 
between earnings capacities of apprentices in different economic sectors in order to see 
whether Soskice´s analysis can be supported empirically  
The results of these studies are not conclusive, however. While some papers find clear 
differences between training establishments on the basis of wages of skilled employees with 
an apprenticeship degree, others conclude that all apprenticeship occupations offer 
comparable earnings opportunities. We argue that the differences in the findings can be 
explained by differences in the empirical approaches. More specifically, most papers only 
look at the impact of employer characteristics on wages in skilled jobs after the end of the 
apprenticeship training. We demonstrate that besides employer characteristics also 
occupation and individual characteristics play an important role for the earnings potential an 
apprenticeship provides. In addition, we show that not all relevant quality characteristics of 
apprenticeships have been studied so far. The average wage effect of changing the employer 
or the occupation masks large differences between the effects for different groups of 
occupations, training establishments, and apprentices with different schooling background. 
Finally, we demonstrate that taking into account differences in wages during the 
apprenticeship period, unobserved heterogeneity between changers and stayers, and the 
endogeneity of the decision to change the employer or the occupation lead to sizeable 
changes in the measured wage effects.  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a brief survey of the 
literature and some theoretical considerations on the relation between wages of stayers and 
changers after apprenticeship training and the quality of apprenticeship training. We 
describe our estimation strategy in Section 3, the data and some descriptive statistics in 
Section 4. Results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Background 
Most papers that investigate differences in the quality of apprenticeship training look at 
wage differences between stayers and changers of employers or occupations. The idea 
behind this procedure is that a change of the employer or the occupation reveals the 
transferability of skills acquired during the apprenticeship on the labour market. Many 
apprentices cannot be sure that they can stay in the establishment that provided their 
apprenticeship training or their occupation. The average retention rate after apprenticeship 
training in Germany is relatively stable around 65 percent (Franz and Zimmermann, 2002; 
Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2008; Seibert and Kleinert, 2009). About 30 percent of 
the apprentices change their occupation within one year after the end of their 
apprenticeship training (Clark and Fahr, 2001). Only seven percent of occupation changers 
do not change their employer and 25 percent find a new employer within one month 
(Seibert and Kleinert, 2009). Therefore it is of key interest for the attractiveness of 
occupations whether there is a wage penalty of changing the employer or the occupation 
after the apprenticeship. The wage penalty for changers in comparison to stayers in addition 
gives us an insight on the specificity and transferability of skills obtained during the 
apprenticeship training. The basic idea is that the contents and the specificity of the skills 
bundle acquired are mainly determined by the occupation-specific curriculum 
(Berufsverordnung) that applies to all training establishments and is therefore given for the 
apprentice. If the apprenticeship provides mainly general (bundles of) human capital, 
apprentices should not face wage disadvantages when they change their employer or their 
occupation directly after their training. If most of the training is firm-specific, other firms are 
not willing to pay the same skilled wage for job starters who changed from another 
employer or occupation as for employees who have been trained by themselves (Lazear, 
2003).  
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All papers in the literature so far either look at wage consequences of occupation 
changes or employer changes. As a consequence, most contributions also only either control 
for differences between characteristics of establishments or occupations. This is a problem 
because both, occupation and employer characteristics have an impact on wages and the 
variables might be correlated – more attractive employers offer more attractive occupations 
and attract more able apprenticeship applicants, for example (Soskice, 1994). It is therefore 
not clear whether the differences between different employers are not mainly the result of 
differences in the occupations these firms offer or the training participants. 
The first line of the literature looks at the wage consequences of employer changes. 
Bougheas and Georgellis (2004) find that apprentices who change their employer experience 
a wage gain in small firms and a wage loss in large firms. The wage losses of those who move 
immediately after the apprenticeship training are much larger than those of movers some 
time after working in a skilled job. Harhoff and Kane (1997) also find a positive wage mark-
up for employer changers immediately after the apprenticeship training. They distinguish 
between employers from the industry and craft sectors and do not find any differences for 
those who change their employers immediately after their training. Werwatz (2002) finds 
that wage losses of changers are larger for apprentices trained in industrial firms. Acemoglu 
and Pischke (1998) also compare the wages of former apprentices who stay in their training 
firms with those who change for different reasons (voluntary quit, lay-off and military draft). 
They hardly find any differences between stayers and the different groups of movers when 
they control for three groups of apprenticeship types and some individual characteristics. 
The papers mentioned so far do not include indicators for occupations. Partly they use wage 
data long after the entry into the skilled labour market which incurs the risk that 
unobservable labour market characteristics after the apprenticeship period have an 
objectionable impact on the results.1 
The second line of research concentrates on the wage effects of occupation changes. 
Occupations are closely related to tasks and therefore the quality of jobs for former 
apprentices mainly is determined by occupations instead of the characteristics of the 
employer (Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). In order to understand differences in the quality of 
apprenticeship training, we therefore propose to control for the occupation in addition to 
                                                          
1
 Harhoff and Kane (1997) only use employees with at least five years of experience, Werwatz (2002) 
includes observations with on average fifteen years experience, and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) 
observe employees who are on average between 14 and 20 years in the labour market. 
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the employer information. The literature that concentrates on occupation faces the problem 
that there are for example fifteen different occupations in electronic occupations that might 
have very similar skill demands while other occupations do not have close substitutes. It 
therefore seems almost impossible to find an indicator for the closeness of occupations with 
different names (Clark and Fahr, 2001). We adopt the pragmatic solution to differentiate 
changes between the first and second digit level of the occupational code.  
Clark and Fahr (2001) find that the wage penalty of voluntarily moving out of the 
apprenticeship occupation is almost zero. For displaced workers, it is around ten percent, 
however. Mainly those who move to a different occupation than the one-digit number face 
costs of changing. They conclude that training is transferable within a broad occupational 
group but not outside of this group. Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004) also look at the wage 
effects of changing the occupation after the apprenticeship training. They find that 
occupation changers even enjoy a wage mark-up. The mark-up is higher if the apprenticeship 
occupations are used instead of the practiced occupations. They interpret this finding as an 
indication that apprentices on average change if they were trained in low paying 
occupations. Both papers do not include employer characteristics.  
Besides comparing the wage effects of changing an occupation by sector, some authors 
also distinguish between occupations with different training length. Schwerdt and Bender 
(2003) estimate the determinants of an employer change after training. They interpret the 
length of the apprenticeship training as an indicator for the amount of specific human capital 
acquired. Winkelmann (1996) who examines the labour market prospects of apprentices in 
comparison to other education groups uses the length of the training spell as an indicator for 
the “intensity” of training.2 An empirical problem of the training length as an indicator of 
apprenticeship quality is that in the data sets available occupations with longer or shorter 
training periods but similar names can not be distinguished. Examples are training 
occupations that take place in full time schools instead of in the dual apprenticeship system3. 
In addition there can be a series of reasons for differences in observed training times such as 
time reductions for those with good school qualifications or repeating spells for those with 
                                                          
2 Note that Winkelmann (1996) uses firm size as proxy for the quality of training because his data 
base, the GSOEP, does not include information on the sector of the establishment nor the occupation 
learnt. 
3 An example is the dual occupation Industriekaufmann versus the full school time occupation 
kaufmännischer Assistent. 
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bad grades in some exams. In this paper, we therefore do not differentiate between lengths 
of training spells but look at differences within instead of between occupations. 
Obviously, employer and occupation changers are not a random sample of the 
apprentices or skilled employees and therefore endogeneity might bias the results of wage 
regressions (Ryan, 2001). The main source of endogeneity is the decision to choose a certain 
employer and occupation. While most contributions try to solve the endogeneity problem by 
using instrumental variables4, some distinguish between (an indicator for) voluntary and 
involuntary changes (Clark and Fahr, 2001; Bougheas and Georgellis, 2004). The latter argue 
that the closure of an enterprise or mass lay-offs can be taken as indicators for an 
involuntary employer change. As a consequence those who change their employer or 
occupation after their former employer went bankrupt or dismissed many people are not 
subject to endogeneity because they did not voluntary decide to change.5  
Dustmann et al. (1997) apply an ordinary least squares model, a Heckman selection 
model and a fixed establishment effects model for differences between the wages in the first 
skilled jobs of employer changers and stayers. The authors take into account that a transition 
oriented perspective is necessary because experiences during apprenticeship training might 
affect wages in the first skilled job and wages during apprenticeship training, in other words 
both wages are state dependent (Ryan, 2001). Dustmann et al. (1997) differentiate between 
eight economic sectors and find large differences in the wage mark-up for changers even 
after controlling for occupations. In their selection model, they use a Heckman correction 
term for the self-selection into the group of changers or stayers. The instruments used are 
the population density in the area where the firm is located as a measure of mobility costs 
and information on the percentage of firms which closes down in the respective year on a 
two digit industry level as a measure for involuntary changers. The Heckman correction term 
is significant and in comparison to the OLS results, only one significant coefficient stays the 
same in the instrumental variables regression. They find that those who change their 
employer and have a skilled employment in the raw materials, construction, or services 
                                                          
4 Typical instruments used are whether the employee was drafted to military service after 
apprenticeship or differences in the time period between joining the firm as an apprentice and the 
firm failure (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Dustmann and Meghir, 2003; Fitzenberger and Spitz, 2004; 
Fersterer et al., 2007). 
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  The contributions use the disappearance of the establishment indicator as a sign for the closure of 
an enterprise. This might be problematic because an establishment indicator might also cease to 
exist because the establishment restructures itself or is bought by another establishment without 
stopping operations. 
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sector face wage disadvantages. In an additional estimation, Dustmann et al. (1997) include 
establishment fixed effects for the sub-sample of establishments with more than one 
apprentice. In this specification, no coefficient is significant any more which might be a 
consequence of the small sample size.  
Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) find a small wage mark-up for employer changers. 
This mark-up is mainly driven by those who move to a larger firm after their apprenticeship 
training. There is a wage reduction, however, if the employer providing the first skilled job is 
smaller than the training firm. Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) also indirectly control for 
employer selectivity by adding wages during the apprenticeship training and include 47 
occupation dummies in their skilled wage estimation.  
We learn from the literature review that we should include indicators for occupations 
and employer characteristics. We should be careful in taking wages a long time period after 
the end of the apprenticeship period and hereby run the risk that confounding effects during 
the skilled career bias the results. In addition, we should include apprenticeship wages or 
other indicators for selectivity into apprenticeship occupations. Indicators for good and bad 
apprenticeships could be firm size, economic sector or occupation group. Finally, the 
endogeneity of changing an occupation or employer and unobserved heterogeneity between 
apprentices and skilled employees should be taken into account. The contributions by 
Dustmann et al. (1997) and Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) come closest to our approach 
because they include establishment and occupational characteristics and they try to take 
into account the endogeneity of staying or changing after apprenticeship period. Both 
contributions use the same dataset as we do, but different observation periods. We will 
show later that this entails a decisive disadvantage. In addition, we add further distinctions 
between employer and employee groups and provide an integrative overview over all 
approaches and their empirical results. In the next section, we describe in detail how we aim 
to obtain a homogeneous sample, control for endogeneity and distinguish between the 
effects for different sub-groups in order to answer the question whether there are good or 
bad apprenticeship occupations.  
 
3 Estimation Strategy 
In this paper, we aim at reducing the impact of selectivity and unobservable differences 
between changers and stayers by taking a number of estimation measures that go beyond 
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the available evidence. We use a similar estimation strategy as for example Dustmann et al. 
(1997) and Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) but change some decisive details. First, we 
concentrate on a very homogeneous sample – apprentices just before the end of their 
apprenticeship training and at the beginning of their first job. This means that all individuals 
have neither tenure nor experience (differences in tenure or experience frequently drive 
wage differences between changers and stayers, Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). We only 
take those employees with gaps between the apprenticeship and the first job of less than 30 
days and we measure the first skilled wage directly at the beginning of the job.6 Almost by 
definition, apprentices who stay in the same firm after completing their apprenticeship 
period do not have a long gap between apprenticeship and first skilled employment.7 In 
addition, we compare the differences between changers and stayers for three wage 
indicators: the wage during apprenticeship, the first skilled wage and the wage mark-up 
between the last apprenticeship spell and the first skilled employment. By including the 
wage during the apprenticeship and the wage mark-up between apprenticeship and first 
skilled job, we are able to capture unobserved heterogeneity in productive ability as well as 
training quality and intensity between movers and stayers that manifest themselves during 
the apprenticeship training (Winkelmann, 1996; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004; von 
Wachter and Bender, 2006). If mainly apprentices with negative unobservable characteristics 
or in establishments with negative characteristics change the employer afterwards, this 
should be already detectable in lower wages during the apprenticeship – therefore the wage 
mark-up is more informative than comparisons of the first skilled wage. 
We only look at wage deviations from the occupation mean in order to get rid of wage 
level effects between occupations for example based on differences in the length or 
                                                          
6 Dustmann et al. (1997) and Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) use the version of the IABS until 1995. 
This version does not include exact notifications when apprentices finished their apprenticeship 
period. Therefore the last apprenticeship spell entails wages for a certain time spell from the skilled 
job for more than 20 percent of the observations. The authors therefore have to use the wage 
information from the first year after finishing the apprenticeship training. Hereby they capture 
heterogeneity in tenure in the first skilled job. In addition, they include observations with long 
unemployment or out of labour force spells between apprenticeship and skilled job – for example 
those who served in the army or did their civil service before starting their first skilled job. 
7 The only exception might be military quitters who return to their training employer (Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998). We therefore exclude apprentices who first serve in the army or other community 
services directly after their apprenticeship before they return to the labour market because these 
employment gaps might lead to wage reductions. 
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intensity of apprenticeship training in the specific occupation after controlling for 
establishment characteristics.  
The estimation procedures described so far should allow us to avoid unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity and selectivity into occupations. The decision of staying or moving to 
another employer or occupation still might be endogeneous, however (Dustmann et al., 
1997). Besides the differences in the quality of apprenticeships also the economic situation 
in the enterprise offering the apprenticeship might be decisive. Former apprentices might be 
forced to change their employer for example because it is in economic hardships and 
reduces the share of apprentices taken over. According to the literature on displaced 
workers, we argue that the true effect of changing the employer can only be measured for 
those who have to change jobs involuntarily. It can usually not be measured, however, 
whether an employee changes the employer voluntarily or not. Therefore, mass lay-offs 
preceding the change in employer (or unemployment) are taken as an indicator for an 
involuntary change (Jacobson et al., 1993; Bender et al., 2002). We therefore use the fact 
that the enterprise had a reduction in employment by more than 30 percent as an 
instrument for the stay/change decision.8 This means that we have to assume that the mass 
lay-off assumption is innocuous in the wage mark-up equation. In addition, in our 
instrumental variable regression we obtain an average treatment effect of the treated, i.e. 
the wage mark-up for those apprentices who changed their employer because it 
encountered a strong decline in employment (and presumably did not take over its 
apprentices as a consequence) and would have stayed in their training establishment 
otherwise (compare Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  
Finally, besides obtaining unbiased wage differences between movers and changers the 
main purpose of this paper is to differentiate between certain apprenticeship quality 
indicators. The indicators relating to the size and the sector of the training firm or the first 
skilled job employer have been frequently used in the empirical literature. In addition to 
that, we introduce the school qualification of the apprentice, training in East or West 
                                                          
8 Dustmann et al. (1997) use the percentage of firms which close down in the respective year on a 
two digit industry level as an instrument in the selectivity term. This means however that the 
instrument is on a higher aggregation level than the instrumented variables and not as closely related 
to the observation as instruments that directly apply to the individual employee. Dustmann and 
Meghir (2005) use firm closure from an additional data file that gives the number of employees. 
Unfortunately, we do not have this information. 
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Germany and three homogeneous occupation groups as quality indicators. We therefore 
differentiate between:  
 wage effect of a change between employer (with and without occupation 
change), 
 wage effect of a change between occupation (with and without employer 
change). We distinguish between all occupation changes and those who at least 
change to an occupation that has a different number on the first level of the 
occupation classification, 
 wage effect of an employer or occupation change from a smaller establishment 
during training to a larger employer for the first skilled job,  
 wage effect of a change from the manufacturing to the service sector,  
 wage effects for changers with higher secondary education (Abitur), 
 wage effects for changers trained in East Germany, 
 wage effects for occupation and employer changers in three selected 
homogeneous occupation groups (commerce and trading occupations, industrial 
occupations, and crafts and construction occupations). 
The occupation groups have been defined on the basis of these theoretical considerations 
(Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008)9: Commerce and trading occupations provide the 
apprentices with relatively general human capital such as communication skills and 
information and communication technology skills that are widely used in the enterprises 
employing these occupations. In these occupations, most enterprises demand rather similar 
skills in the areas communication as well as in information and communication technologies. 
These technologies are widely used in all enterprises and also the mixture of the skills 
demanded seems to be rather similar. In industrial occupations such as electronics, IT, 
chemicals and metal-working, it takes some time until proficiency is achieved, most 
apprenticeships take three and a half years instead of three years and it seems probable that 
additional experience after the completion of the apprenticeship training is necessary to 
reach full productivity. This means that the specificity of the skills learnt might be high. An 
additional argument for the high specificity of these occupations is that they are frequently 
new or recently adopted to the rapid technological change in these fields. Lazear (2003) 
argues that new skills might be more specific than traditional skills. Finally, skilled employees 
                                                          
9 We exclude other occupations from the analysis because these groups are very heterogeneous. 
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in industrial occupations are hard to find. This implies that training firms have relatively high 
retention rates, invest in apprenticeship training and offer attractive internal labour markets 
(Büchel and Neubäumer, 2001; Dionisius et al., 2008). In our last occupation group (crafts 
and construction occupations) the skills learnt might be rather general, the skill mix 
demanded however might differ between enterprises. A typical example might be the 
change between a small bakery to an industrial bakery after the apprenticeship. The quality 
of these apprenticeships might be low because the employers only provide their apprentices 
with the basic skills necessary for their specific job in order to save investment costs, 
apprenticeships usually take three years and most applicants have a weaker qualification 
background than the other occupation groups (Soskice, 1994; Dionisius et al., 2008).  
 Our distinction between the occupation groups is supported by the argument that 
the more specific the skill requirements of an occupation compared to the labour market in 
general, the smaller is the probability that workers change occupations after completion of 
apprenticeship training (Geel et al., 2008). Apprentices in more specific occupations are 
stuck because a change of occupation would reduce the value of their specific skill 
combination. Our occupation groups indeed differ with respect to the share of employer and 
occupation changers (compare Table A510 and Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008) – in the 
commerce and trading occupations and in the construction and craft occupations changing 
employer and/or occupation is more common than in industrial occupations. 
On the basis of the previous literature, we have contradictory hypotheses on the average 
wage impact of employer and occupation changes. We might expect however that a change 
into an occupation group that is nearer according to the occupation classification has a 
smaller negative impact on wages than a change to a more distant occupation group, 
compare Clark and Fahr (2001). According to the empirical evidence and our theoretical 
considerations, we expect the following impact of the interactions between occupation 
and/or employer changes: An increase in the firm size after changing should be positive for 
the changer (Winkelmann, 1996; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). A change from 
manufacturing to services should be negative (Werwatz, 2002). Apprentices with a higher 
secondary schooling background should be privileged and enjoy a higher training quality 
(Soskice, 1994). It is well known that many of the apprentices with a higher secondary 
                                                          
10
 The shares of changers in our table are lower than those presented in the literature because we only look at 
changers directly between the end of the apprenticeship period and the first skilled job and in addition restrict 
our sample to those without long interruption spells between apprenticeship period and skilled job. 
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education choose the apprenticeship qualifications in Germany as a risk avoidance strategy 
(Pilz, 2009). As a consequence, they obtain better apprenticeship training and get favourable 
treatment by enterprises interested in attracting them after the end of their apprenticeship 
period. Apprentices in East Germany should encounter a stronger wage reduction because 
they face a worse external labour market situation with higher unemployment rates for 
skilled employees than the West German colleagues. For apprentices in commerce and 
trading occupations, we expect a positive impact because they work in an environment that 
supports changes, acquire relatively general human capital and relatively low investment by 
the training firms (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008). For apprentices in industrial occupations 
a change should incur a wage loss because employers see changers as a negative selection 
and the human capital acquired is rather specific. In addition, high net costs induce 
employers to keep their (best) apprentices. Changers in the crafts and construction 
occupation also should face wage reductions because the quality in training is low, training 
contents are frequently specific, and other employers are not willing to take them for the 
same wage because an apprenticeship in these occupations is regarded as low quality 
(Soskice, 1994). 
The econometric specification is a log-linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
and has the following form:  
 
´ ´ ,i i i iY X V  (1) 
 
where Yi is the individual deviation from the occupation-specific average wage or wage 
mark-up (in logs), X is a change of employer or occupation dummy or an interaction term of 
this dummy with our groups of individuals, employers or occupations summarised above. V 
is a vector of individual and firm-specific control variables.  
We perform a couple of robustness checks that also allow us to compare our results to 
those presented in the literature. Our first reference is a pooled OLS estimation that includes 
all observations between one and a half years before the end of the apprenticeship training 
until two years after the beginning of the first skilled job (as long as the job was not 
changed). In order to have comparable results to those contributions that only use 
observations in skilled jobs, we also reduce our sample for the pooled OLS estimation to the 
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observations in the first skilled job. In a next step, in order to get rid of unobservable time-
invariant heterogeneity such as work motivation or ability, we take into account individual 
fixed effects (Yankow, 2006).11 We take individual wage observations half a year, a year and 
one and a half years before the end of the apprenticeship training and half a year, a year, 
one and a half years, and two years after the first skilled job starts. Together with the 
information on the wage at the end of the apprenticeship training and at the start of the first 
skilled job, we therefore have maximally nine wage observations per person and can include 
a fixed effect δi into our wage equation: 
 
´ ´ .it it it i itY X V  (2) 
 
In order to additionally check the robustness of the wage effects measured directly at the 
beginning of the first skilled job, we run further regressions with the wage mark-ups at the 
end of the apprenticeship training and half a year and one year after starting the first skilled 
job.  
Finally, we take into account the possible endogeneity of changing after the 
apprenticeship training. According to the literature, we define a mass lay-off as a reduction 
in employment in one establishment larger than 30 percent of the labour force within one 
year.12 We therefore assume that the chance that somebody involuntary changed the 
employer is much higher if a mass lay-off took place in the last year of the apprenticeship. 
We show that the mass lay-off indicator is a valid instrument: Mass lay-offs are not 
correlated with the average ability of apprentice cohorts but induced by unexpected 
changes in labour demand. On the other hand, mass lay-offs are highly correlated with an 
apprentice´s propensity to change the employer or the occupation (Von Wachter and 
Bender, 2006).  
 
                                                          
11 Von Wachter and Bender (2006) and Dustmann et al., (1997) present establishment fixed effects 
regressions. This is conceptually different because it only wipes out unobserved heterogeneity 
between establishments that affects all apprentices irrespective of their occupation.  In addition, 
they only can use establishments with more than one apprentice which dramatically reduces their 
sample because a large share of the establishments only employs one apprentice. 
12 Von Wachter and Bender (2006) use deviations from the average retention rate of the training firm 
as an instrument for involuntary employer change. We cannot construct the retention rate in our 
data, however, because we only observe a sample of the employees in each firm. 
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4 Data 
We use longitudinal official register data collected by the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB) from the years 1993 to 2003. Constructing a subsample of individuals moving from 
apprenticeship to first employment, we exploit the so-called employment and benefits 
history (IABS04) with spell information for each individual in the sample. For the wage mark-
up version, we observe the termination of the apprenticeship training and the start of the 
first skilled job for every individual only once, creating a sample of repeated cross-sections. 
For the pooled OLS versions with all wage observations or with the skilled wage 
observations, we can use several spells per employee. 
We focus on employed individuals aged 16 to 25, their last apprenticeship training 
and their first skilled employment spell. Additionally, we eliminate those employees with 
either a university degree or an occupational degree which cannot be obtained by a dual 
vocational training (mostly full-time school-based training), compare Clark and Fahr (2001). 
Our interest is the wage difference between apprentices who remain with their training firm 
and/or occupation (`stayer´) and those changing to another employer and/or occupation 
(`changer´). Until the year 1992, firms did not have to report a change in the status of their 
employee from apprentice to full-time employee if they stayed with their training firm. This 
is the reason why we consider spell information only from the year 1993 on (compare 
Dustmann et al., 1997). We therefore know the precise end of the apprenticeship and the 
precise start of the first skilled job and the related wages. We take the daily wage of the last 
spell before the end of the apprenticeship training and the first daily wage when working in 
a skilled job taking into account wage inflation.  
Estimations on basis of the IABS are usually subject to the problem that wages are 
censored at the social benefit contribution ceiling and that also experience and tenure are 
censored at certain dates (1970 for West German employees). We only consider job starters 
with relatively low wages and therefore these data problems do not affect our estimations 
(Dustmann et al., 1997). The information on the schooling level of employees in the 
employment statistics may be inconsistent because the information is not obligatory in the 
IABS (Fitzenberger et al., 2006). The interaction terms between changers and higher 
secondary education might therefore be interpreted with caution. Finally, we use a trimmed 
sample where observations below the 1 percent and above the 99 percent deviation 
quantile are dropped in order to exclude outliers. 
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On the firm level, information on the size of the training firm (during apprenticeship) 
and the employing firm (during the first skilled job) as well as the economic sector of the 
employing and training firm are used as control variables (see Table A.1 for details on 
variables). On the individual level, age, sex, and nationality are used as controls. 
Please note that we observe the employer on the establishment level. This means 
that a change from one establishment to another within a conglomerate of establishments 
cannot be identified (Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004). Still, specific skills acquired might be 
lost when changing within establishments of a conglomerate. Descriptive statistics of our 
variables can be found in Table A.2. 
 
5 Results 
Our estimation results are displayed in Table 1. The first two columns explain the wage 
deviations from the occupational mean in the last spell of the apprenticeship, the second 
two columns the wage deviations in the first spell of the first skilled job, and the last two 
columns the deviation of the wage mark-up between last apprenticeship wage and first 
skilled wage. Our main interest lies in the coefficients of the employer changers (the first 
line). We find a significant negative wage impact of an employer change of about two 
percent on the first skilled wage (see column “first skilled job” in Table 1). This finding is 
analogous to the results presented by Bougheas and Georgellis (2004) and Dustmann et al. 
(1997) who use differences in the absolute average entry wage for all occupations. Contrary 
to that, Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) – who control for differences in apprenticeship 
wages – find a positive wage premium for employer changers. We show that the reason for 
these differences is that the employer changers had an even stronger negative wage 
disadvantage of more than three percent at the end of their apprenticeship period in 
comparison to the average occupation wage (compare column “apprenticeship” in Table 1). 
As a consequence, the true effect of employer changing is (weakly) significantly positive 
instead of significantly negative (see column “mark-up” in Table 1)13. The negative wage 
coefficients reported in the literature for employer changers therefore seem to be a 
statistical artefact induced by not controlling for the lower wages of the changers already 
                                                          
13
 Please note that the coefficients between the columns do not add up because we use different sets of 
covariates controlling for establishment characteristics during apprenticeship training when the apprenticeship 
wage is explained and for establishment characteristics after the apprenticeship training when the first skilled 
wage is explained. 
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during the apprenticeship training. We also find that those who were paid worse during their 
apprenticeship period (either because they have negative individual unobserved 
characteristics or their employers have negative unobserved characteristics) are stronger 
inclined to change the employer. This is particularly true for those skilled employees who 
change employer and occupation. The wage disadvantage of those who only change their 
employer after apprenticeship training without also changing their occupation is smaller and 
the wage mark-up does not significantly differ from that of the stayers (compare the first 
line in Table 2). 
We now turn to the wage effects of changing the occupation classification at least at 
the second classification level. Those who change their occupation directly after their 
apprenticeship training without changing their employer suffer a small but significant wage 
mark-up disadvantage and those who change occupation and their employer do not face a 
wage disadvantage (lines two and three in Table 2). Occupation changers do have lower 
wages at the end of their apprenticeship training, however, also compare Fitzenberger and 
Spitz (2004). According to Clark and Fahr (2001) those who change to another occupation on 
the first classification level suffer a slightly larger wage disadvantage. As they have a lower 
wage already during their apprenticeship period, the wage mark-up is not significantly 
different from zero, however. 
Particularly large are the wage advantages of changers with higher secondary 
education. This group has a share of roughly one percent and has to be treated especially 
favourably by prospective employers because it has the attractive outside option of 
obtaining an academic degree. In accordance with Euwals and Winkelmann (2004), we find 
that changers from a smaller to a larger enterprise profit from this decision. In the other 
subgroups, employer or occupation changers do not have different wage mark-ups in 
comparison to stayers (compare Table 2). Those who change from manufacturing to services 
have lower initial wages in their first skilled job (Werwatz, 2002). As their wages also have 
been lower already during their apprenticeship training, there is no difference in their wage 
mark-up. According to our hypothesis also East German occupation and employer changers 
suffer wage disadvantages – their mark-up is not significantly different from those who do 
not change, however. 
If we group apprenticeships into relatively homogeneous occupation sub-groups, we 
find the following interesting pattern: in trading and commerce occupations, employer 
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changers enjoy a significant positive wage mark-up. In industrial occupations the mark-up is 
significantly negative and for craft and construction occupations changers and stayers have 
the same wage mark-up. According to our hypotheses this might mean that the specificity of 
training contents in trading and commerce occupations is relatively low. As a consequence, 
establishments with apprentices in these occupations are not willing to invest (much) in 
apprenticeship training because their apprentices can leave their training firm without a cost 
(Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008). In industrial occupations employer changers suffer from a 
high specificity of their training and strong internal labour markets that reduce their 
employment opportunities outside of the training firm. Occupations changers in industrial 
occupations also face financial disadvantages whereas occupation changers in the other 
occupation groups do not have a disadvantage. The wage penalties of employer and 
occupation changers in industrial occupations induce training firms to invest in these 
apprenticeships (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008). 
In order to obtain comparable results to those derived in the previous literature, we 
also report the coefficients for employer and occupation change for the pooled OLS for the 
observations in the first skilled job. According to our previous results for differences in wages 
in the first skilled job, we get negative coefficients for employer and/or occupation changers 
(compare the first column in Table 3). The wage disadvantage is again higher for those who 
change at least the first level occupation classification than for the occupation changers who 
stay closer to their apprenticeship occupation. Please note that the coefficients obtained in 
the pooled OLS regressions are generally higher and more significant than in the regressions 
using the last apprenticeship wage, the first skilled wage or the wage mark-up. These results 
might be indications for an over-estimation of losses in previous papers that use wage 
information considerable time after the first skilled job started. 
We eliminate unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity between employer and/or 
occupation stayers and changers by applying fixed effects regressions. Analogously to the 
wage mark-up results, the negative coefficients for occupation and employer changers 
disappear (also compare Dustmann et al., 1997). We find instead a small positive and 
significant impact for employer and occupation changers (except changes of occupation at 
least at the second occupation level, compare column 2 of Table 3). Also using observations 
some time before and after the start of the first skilled job again increases size and 
significance of the measured wage mark-up. 
18 
 
The wage mark-up results in Tables 1 and 2 take into account financial disadvantages or 
advantages of changers during the apprenticeship training that are indicators of unobserved 
heterogeneity between both groups. Endogeneity of employer or occupation changing still 
remains a problem because we cannot assume that changing is random and selectivity can 
fully be captured by controlling the wage level during the apprenticeship training period. We 
therefore first explain in two Probit estimations the probability that an apprentice changes 
his or her occupation or employer including the covariates used in the wage equation plus a 
dummy variable indicating whether the number of employees decreased by more than 30 
percent during the last half a year of the apprenticeship. The mass lay-off variable has high 
explanatory power (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests and Hausman 
tests indicate that employer and occupation changing are endogeneous in the wage mark-up 
estimation and our mass lay-off indicator is a valid instrument to control for endogeneity 
(also see Table A4). If we use the predicted change probability taking into account the mass 
lay-offs, the wage mark-up for employer changers increases to 0.34 and the mark-up for 
occupation changers decreases to -0.43, both coefficients are not significant, however. This 
means that the coefficients increase (in absolute values) but lose significance.14  
The analogous instrumental variables regressions for the pooled observations of skilled 
employment also lead to higher coefficients, the signs are unchanged, however (compare 
Table 4, columns three and four and Dustmann et al., 1997). As indicated previously, we 
strictly spoken cannot compare the coefficients in the IV and the OLS regressions because 
the IV coefficients apply for the specific group of apprentices who changed their employer or 
occupation because their establishment suffered a mass lay-off (average treatment effect of 
the treated). 
In our last robustness check, we calculate the wage mark-up between the last 
apprenticeship wage and the wage 180 and 365 days after the start of the first skilled job for 
those who are still at the same employer after this period of time. The wage mark-up is 
stronger positive for employer changers than the wage mark-up directly measured at the 
start of the first skilled employment. For occupation changers without employer change the 
negative wage impact increases (in absolute values), compare Table A4. These results remain 
unchanged if we restrict both samples to those employees who are observed at the same 
                                                          
14 Tentative regressions for the sub-groups including the predicted changing probabilities interacted 
with these groups (not shown here) indicate a similar trend for the coefficients of the IV mark-up 
regressions in comparison to the OLS regressions. 
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employer half a year or a full year after starting their first skilled job.15 According to our 
dindings using the pooled skilled wages our results indicate that the wage effects measured 
some time after the actual start of the first skilled job are larger, it remains unclear whether 
it takes some time until the full wage effect of changing evolves or other unobservable 
events on the labour market or at the employers are the reason for these findings, however. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper tests several frequently discussed hypotheses on the quality of apprenticeship 
training in Germany. A distinction is made between apprenticeship training in companies of 
different size, in manufacturing vs. services, in East vs. West Germany, for apprentices with 
and without upper secondary school education and in three homogeneous occupation 
groups. The quality of apprenticeship training is measured by the wage loss incurred if an 
apprentice has to change his or her employer and/or the occupation directly after the 
training period. Besides using a homogeneous sample of apprentices directly before and 
after the end of the apprenticeship training, we simultaneously control for employer, 
individual, and occupation characteristics. In addition, we take into account the selection 
into the changer and stayer group, unobserved time invariant heterogeneity and differences 
in wages within instead of between occupations by using deviations from occupation means.  
Little wage advantages for those who change their employers directly after the 
apprenticeship training are indicators for the German dual apprenticeship training system to 
provide generally usable human capital (Korpi and Mertens, 2003). There are small average 
wage losses of occupation changes for those who do not change their employer 
simultaneously. Occupation changes do not have a wage impact in general, however. These 
small average effects mask large differences by occupation groups. For apprentices in 
trading and commerce occupations changing employers is associated with a positive wage 
mark-up. Apprentices in manufacturing occupations (more specifically in metal working, 
electronics, IT, and chemicals occupations) suffer wage disadvantages when they have to 
change their employer and/or their occupation. Changers in crafts and construction 
occupations have the same wages as stayers. These findings do not necessarily mean that 
                                                          
15 The coefficients and standard errors for the reduced sample for employer changers is for 180/ 365 
days respectively analogously to the wage mark-up calculated in Table 2: 0.004 (0.003)/ 0.003 (0.003) 
and for occupation changers -0.003 (0.003)/ -0.002 (0.003). 
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industrial occupations have a lower quality than trade and commerce occupations – we 
know indeed that they are characterised by longer training periods, better internal labour 
market prospects and higher (net) costs for the training firms. Wage disadvantages in 
industrial occupations therefore might mainly be the consequence of a higher specificity of 
training contents. 
Those apprentices with an upper secondary education who change their employer enjoy 
wage advantages. This might be a consequence of their attractive outside options (an 
academic career instead of switching to another employer or occupation). We do not find 
differences for changers in East-Germany, between manufacturing and services or from a 
smaller apprenticeship establishment to a larger first skilled employer.  
By comparing the results between the wage mark-up and wages in the last 
apprenticeship spell and the first skilled employment, we demonstrate that analyses that do 
not take into account differences in apprenticeship wages obtain biased results because 
changers frequently already earn lower wages during their apprenticeship period. In the 
literature this effect is controlled by using fixed effects regressions. Fixed effects regressions 
are problematic, however, because they use wage observations some time after the start of 
the first skilled job. We show that this leads to (potentially biased) higher and more 
significant findings. Taking into account selectivity into changing by using an instrumental 
variables approach entailing a mass lay-off variable for the last half a year of the 
apprenticeship period leads to an increase in the coefficients but a loss in their significance. 
Finally, we control for unobserved differences between occupations by using deviations 
from occupation means instead of between occupation comparisons. 
This paper therefore demonstrates that differences in the estimation approach are an 
important reason for differences in findings on earnings capacities provided by different 
apprenticeship trainings. It additionally shows that differences in apprenticeship quality are 
usually small between economic sectors of the training firm or its size and location. These 
differences have been at the centre of interest in the previous literature, however. Large 
differences are found between occupation groups and the qualification background of 
apprentices – distinctions proposed in this paper for the first time. 
So far, we only account for the establishment characteristics economic sector and firm 
size. It seems important, however, to compare the impact of other establishment 
characteristics such as industrial relations, profits or business strategy on apprenticeship 
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quality that have not been analysed so far. We can assume that analogously to the large 
differences in occupation groups also certain training firms offer better earnings prospects 
for their apprentices after changing their employer and/or occupation. The exploitation of 
linked employer-employee data for this purpose is a promising field for further research on 
this topic. 
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Tables 
Table 1: OLS regression explaining individual deviation from occupation-specific average 
wage or average wage mark-up  
 Apprenticeship  First skilled job  Mark-up  
 Coeff.  S. D.  Coeff.  S. D.  Coeff.  S. D. 
Employer change -0.034  *** (0.003)  -0.022  *** (0.003)  0.006  * (0.003)  
Age  0.023  *** (0.001)  0.016  *** (0.001)  -0.008  *** (0.001)  
Sex  -0.028  *** (0.004)  -0.035  *** (0.003)  -0.005  (0.004)  
Nationality 0.039  *** (0.006)  0.043  *** (0.004)  0.003  (0.006)  
Firm size  dummies apprenticeship  Yes   No   Yes   
Firm size dummies skilled 
employment  
No   Yes   Yes   
Sector dummies apprenticeship  Yes   No   Yes   
Sector dummies skilled employment No   Yes   Yes   
Year dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant  -0.025  *** (0.005)  -0.000  (0.004)  0.011  (0.014)  
N  50,699   50,699   50,699   
Adj. R2  0.098   0.116   0.019   
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile, waves 1993-2003. 
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. Significance levels: : 10%, : 5%, : 1%.  
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Table 2: OLS regressions explaining individual deviation from occupation-specific average 
wage or average wage mark-up 
 Apprenticeship  First skilled job  Mark-up  
 Coeff.  S.D.  Coeff.  S. D.  Coeff.  S. D. 
Employer change without 
occupation change 
-0.013 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 
Occupation change -0.018 (0.004) -0.020 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
Occupation change without 
employer change 
-0.021 (0.005) -0.025 (0.004) -0.007   (0.004)  
Occupation change – 2 -0.030 (0.004) -0.028 (0.003) 0.004  (0.004) 
Employer change X  
manufacturing into services 
-0.135   (0.008)  -0.088   (0.008)  0.007  (0.012)  
Occupation change X  
manufacturing into services 
-0.141   (0.011)  -0.062  *** (0.009)  -0.001   (0.013)  
Employer change X change into 
larger enterprise 
-0.069  *** (0.005)  -0.091   (0.005)  0.008  (0.005)  
Occupation change X change 
into larger enterprise 
-0.081  *** (0.008)  0.022  *** (0.005)  0.054  (0.036)  
Employer change X upper 
secondary education 
0.022 ** (0.009) 0.059 *** (0.007) 0.045 *** (0.009) 
Occupation change X upper 
secondary  educ. 
0.018  (0.011) 0.037 ** (0.011) 0.019  (0.012) 
Employer change X East 
Germany 
-0.227 *** (0.007) -0.216 *** (0.006) 0.007  (0.008) 
Occupation change X East 
Germany 
-0.205 *** (0.008) -0.208 *** (0.007) -0.004  (0.008) 
Employer change X commerce 
and trading  
-0.029   (0.004)  0.016 
*** (0.004)  0.032   (0.005)  
Employer change X industrial 
occupations 
-0.030  *** (0.006)  -0.046 *** (0.005)  -0.024  *** (0.006)  
Employer change X crafts and 
construction  
-0.051  *** (0.006)  -0.038  *** (0.005)  -0.005   (0.007)  
Occupation change X commerce 
and trading  
-0.013 ** (0.006) -0.009 * (0.005) 0.002 (0.006) 
Occupation change X industrial 
occupations 
-0.013 ** (0.005) -0.030 *** (0.005) -0.018 (0.006) 
Occupation change X crafts and 
construction  
-0.054 *** (0.008) -0.047 *** (0.007) 0.003 (0.008) 
Notes: Covariates (besides employer change) and other notes as in regressions in Table 1, 
every line separate regression besides joint estimations using three occupation dummy 
interaction.  
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Table 3:  Pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions explaining individual deviation from 
occupation-specific wage  
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects  
 Coeff.  S.D.  Coeff.  S. D.  
Employer 
Change  
-0.065  *** (0.022)  0.012 (0.001) 
Employer 
change without 
occupation 
change 
-0.025 (0.002) 0.013 (0.001) 
Occupation 
change 
-0.066  *** (0.002)  0.007  (0.001)  
Occupation 
change without 
employer 
change 
-0.014 *** (0.004) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Occupation 
change  - 2 
-0.075 *** (0.003) -0.006  (0.004) 
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile, waves 1993-2003. 
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. We take individual cluster effects into account in the 
pooled OLS regressions. Covariates in OLS regressions: age, sex, nationality, size and sector 
of first skilled employer, year dummies; covariates in FE regression are the same except sex 
and nationality. Significance levels: : 10%, : 5%, : 1%.  
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Table 4:  Instrumental variable regression explaining individual deviations from 
occupation-specific deviations for the first skilled wages and the wage mark-up between 
apprenticeship and first skilled wage 
 
IV Wage Mark-up 
Employer Change 
IV Wage Mark-up 
Occupation Change  
Pooled IV First 
Skilled Wage 
Employer 
Change 
Pooled IV First 
Skilled Wage 
Occupation 
Change 
 Coeff.  
Std. 
Dev.  
Coeff.  Std. Dev.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
Change  0.047   (0.030)  -0.034 (0.025) -0.156 *** -0.049 
Age  -0.006   (0.001)  -0.006   (0.001)  0.010 
*** 0.009*** 
Sex  -0.009  (0.004)  -0.008   (0.004)  -0.017 ** -0.016*** 
Nationality 0.005  (0.006)  0.006   (0.006)  0.046 
*** 0.043*** 
Firm size 
apprenticeship 
dummies  
Yes   Yes   No  No 
Firm size skilled 
employment 
dummies  
Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.006  (0.012)  -0.004  (0.013)  -0.216 *** -0.203*** 
Observations 41892   41892   96572  96572 
Adj. R2  0.018   0.018   0.108  0.108 
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile, waves 1993-2003. 
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, significance levels: : 10%, : 5%, : 1%. 
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Table A.1: Variable Definition 
Variable  Type   Definition 
Dependent variables  
Deviation first job  Dev.  
Positive if individual earns in its first job more than the 
occupation/year specific average  
Deviation 
Apprenticeship  
Dev.  
Positive if individual earns at the end of the apprenticeship period 
more than the occupation/year specific average  
Deviation mark-up  Dev.  
Positive if individual has a higher wage mark-up than the 
occupation/year specific average  
Variables of interest  
Employer  0/1  1 if individual changed employer after apprenticeship  
Occupation 0/1 
1 if individual changed occupation after apprenticeship at least at 
the second occupational level 
Occupation – 1 0/1 
1 if individual changed occupation at least at the first 
occupational level 
Occupation 
dummies  
1-3  
Commerce and trading occupations, industrial occupations and 
crafts/construction occupations  
Explanatory variables  
Age Dev.  Age of individual at time of first skilled employment  
Sex  Dev.  Positive if individual is female  
Nationality Dev.  Positive if individual has foreign nationality  
Higher Secondary 
Education 
Dev. 
Positive if individual has completed a higher secondary school 
education (Abitur) 
Unemployment  Dev.  
Positive if individual was registered unemployed after 
apprenticeship  
Firm size 
apprentice  
Dev.  
Size of the training firm, 8 dummies for 1-9, 10-49,50-99, 100-249, 
250-499, 500-999, 1000-4999, 5000+ employees 
Firm size employee  Dev.  Size of firm in first skilled job, 8 dummies  
Firm sector 
dummies 
0/1  
Dummies for: Water and power, manufacturing, construction, 
trading, traffic and communication, finance, hospitality and 
restaurants, rent and lease, services   
Y1994 to Y2003  0/1  Year dummies for 1994 to 2003, reference year: 1993  
Notes:  0/1=dummy variable, dev. = variable computed as individual deviation from the 
mean by occupation and year.  
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Table A.2: Summary statistics in absolute values dependent variables 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
Employer change  0.190  (0.301)  0 1  
Employer change without occupation change 0.088 (0.283) 0 1 
Occupation change  0.160  (0.367)  0  1  
Occupation change without employer change 0.055 (0.228) 0 1 
Occupation change -1  0.141  (0.348)  0  1 
Commercial trading  0.084  (0.277)  0  1  
Employer change X change from manufacturing into services 0.023 (0.149) 0 1 
Occupation change X change manufacturing into services 0.016 (0.130) 0 1 
Employer change X change into larger enterprise 0.089 (0.286) 0 1 
Occupation change X change into larger enterprise 0.098 (0.298) 0 1 
Employer change X upper secondary education 0.013 (0.113) 0 1 
Occupation change X upper secondary  education 0.010 (0.098) 0 1 
Employer change X East Germany 0.087 (0.282) 0 1 
Occupation change X East Germany 0.071 (0.258) 0 1 
Employer change X commercial trading occupations 0.063 (0.243) 0 1 
Employer change X metal working occupations 0.018 (0.135) 0 1 
Employer change X crafts and construction occupations 0.031 (0.173) 0 1 
Occupation change X commercial trading occupations 0.046 (0.209) 0 1 
Occupation change X industrial occupations 0.020 (0.144) 0 1 
Occupation change X crafts and construction occupations 0.020 (0.141) 0 1 
Data Source: Sample drawn from IABS scientific usefile, waves 1993-2003. 
 
     
30 
 
Table A.3: Summary statistics in absolute values covariates 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trading and commerce 0.364  (0.500)  0  1  
Industrial occupations   0.255  (0.227)  0  1  
Crafts, construction  0.209  (0.133)  0  1  
Age  20.958  (1.703)  16  25  
Sex  0.410  (0.492)  0  1  
Nationality 0.068  (0.251)  0  1  
Higher secondary education 0.041 (0.199) 0 1 
Unemployment  0.002  (0.042)  0  1  
East Germany 0.159 (0.365) 0 1 
Firm size app.* < 10  0.177  (0.382)  0  1  
Firm size app. 10 - 49  0.285  (0.452)  0  1  
Firm size app. 50 - 99  0.112  (0.315)  0  1  
Firm size app. 100 - 249  0.142  (0.349)  0  1  
Firm size app. 250 - 499  0.097  (0.296)  0  1  
Firm size app. 500 - 999  0.078  (0.269)  0  1  
Firm size app. 1000 - 4999  0.084  (0.277)  0  1  
Firm size app. > 5000  0.024  (0.154)  0  1  
Firm size emp.** < 10  0.185  (0.388)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 10 - 49  0.293  (0.455)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 50 - 99  0.112  (0.315)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 100 - 249  0.138  (0.345)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 250 - 499  0.093  (0.290)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 500 - 999  0.073  (0.260)  0  1  
Firm size emp. 1000 - 4999  0.081  (0.273)  0  1  
Firm size emp. > 5000  0.024  (0.154)  0  1  
Water and power  0.015  (0.121)  0  1  
Manufacturing  0.359  (0.480)  0  1  
Construction  0.131  (0.337)  0  1  
Trading 0.206  (0.404)  0  1  
Traffic and communication  0.038  (0.192)  0  1  
Finance  0.119  (0.323)  0  1  
Hotels and restaurants  0.013  (0.111)  0  1  
Rent and lease  0.082  (0.275)  0  1  
Services  0.038  (0.192)  0  1  
Number of observations  30,642     
Data Source: see Table A2, notes: * app. means employer during last spell of 
apprenticeship, ** emp. means employer during first skilled job. 
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Table A.3: Probit regressions explaining individual probability to change the employer or the 
occupation at the end of the apprenticeship period 
Variable Employer change Occupation change 
Mass lay-off in last half a year of 
apprenticeship period 0.593 ***  0.157 ***  
Age  0.014 ***  0.022 ***  
Sex  0.165 ***  -0.008   
Nationality -0.022   0.003   
Firm size dummies 
apprenticeship Yes    Yes  
Firm size dummies skilled 
employment Yes    Yes  
Sector dummies apprenticeship Yes    Yes  
Sector dummies skilled 
employment Yes    Yes  
Year dummies  Yes    Yes  
Constant  -1.684 ***  -2.187 ***  
Pseudo R2 0.08    0.08  
N 41892    41892  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square 
test1 F(1,41891) = 3.940** (0.047) F(141891) = 3.684* (0.055) 
Wu-Hausman F test 1 Chi-sq(1) =3.945** (0.047) Chi-sq(1) =3.688* (0.055) 
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile 1993-2003. 
Notes: 1 p-values in brackets, significance levels: : 10%, : 5%, : 1%.  
 
Table A.4: Regression with individual deviation from occupation-specific average wage mark-
up between last apprenticeship wage and wage 180 and 365 days after entry into first job 
Variable 180 days after entry 365 after days entry 
Employer change 0.023*** (0.004)   0.035 *** (0.004)  
Employer change without 
occupation change 0.015*** (0.004)   0.025 *** (0.005)  
Occupation change 0.000 (0.004)   0.003  (0.004)  
Occupation change without 
employer change -0.017*** (0.005)   -0.021 *** (0.006)  
Occupation change (1-digit 
level occupation) 0.004 (0.004)   0.007  (0.005)  
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile 1993-2003. 
Notes: Significance levels: : 10%, : 5%, : 1%.  
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Table A.5: Share of changers by occupation groups, directly after apprenticeship training 
Occupation group 
Share of employer 
movers 
Share of occupation 
movers 
Trading 17.3 12.6 
Industrial 10.9 7.8 
Crafts, construction 14.7 9.6 
Average (including other occupations) 15.9 13.1 
Data Source: IABS scientific usefile 1993-2003, complete sample. 
 
